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I. Introduction 
A. The Purpose 
The general purpose of this thesis is to make a 
comparative analysis between low priced and high priced com-
mon stocks in an attempt to discover the relative opportuni-
ties or advantages available to the investor of small means 
as regards this type of investment. 
Since the small investor is limited in the amount 
of money he has available for investment in securities, he 
is naturally attracted to those with low market prices. It 
is almost universally assumed that one with limited resourses 
would rather own ten shares of a particular stock than one 
share of another stock whose market value is ten times great-
er than that of each share of the former stock. The reason 
for this is possibly a combination of the psychological 
effect of owning ten shares rather than one, and the dream of 
very rapid capital appreciation through a soaring rise of a 
low price stock. 
Many financial le~ders are of the opinion that the 
man of small means should place his money only in those sec-
urities which give assurance of income with the least possible 
risk of capital, and many others believe that the man of small 
means should stay out of the stock market entirely. This 
group adheres to the philosophy that the man of small means 
can stand only the minimum of risk on his capital. However, 
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in recent years theory has developed to the effect that the 
man of small means can find as much room for sound invest-
ment in the stock market as can the large investor. It is 
further claimed that such investment would create a health-
ier condition not only in the stock market itself, but also 
in the economic and political position of the nation. 
In this regard, Dr. Jacob 0. Kamm, Director of the 
School of Commerce at Baldwin-Wallace College in Ohio, ex-
pressed the following opinion. 
"Certainly, there has been too much 
emphasis on the need for a minimum of 
several thousand dollars in order to in-
vest in common stocks. America has been 
built on the savings of small investors. 
A man with a few hundred dollars in addi-
tion to a savings account and a life in-
surance program is not exercising one of 
the most democratic privilages he has if 
he fails to own at least a few shares of 
stock in American private industry. 
The broader stock ownership becomes, 
the less the menace of communism will be 
a domestic problem. Colleges and univer-
sities through their educational train-
ing in investing are helping to broaden 
the investing class and thereby helping to 
build a greater America."* 
B. Work~ & Others 
Much work has been done by others concerning low 
priced stocks. Most of this work, however, related to the 
relative current position of certain selected issues and the 
characteristics which should be sought in studying low priced 
* 18, p.l3 
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stocks for possible investment. Frequently, many investment 
advisory services and investment houses will make available 
information resulting from studies on selected low priced 
stocks as regards possible current investment. It is also 
common practice in many textbooks on investment to include 
information on certain favorable characteristics or posi-
tions sometimes found in particular issues in the low price 
group. 
Some time after work on this thesis was commenced, 
the Magazine of Viall Street published in its January 27, 1951 
issue an article by J, c. Clifford entitled "A Timely Evalua-
tion of Low Priced Stocks 11 • In this article, Mr. Clifford 
drew a comparison between high priced and low priced stocks 
regarding their recent market action and relative current 
position. In accomplishing this, Mr. Clifford made use of 
an index of 100 selected low priced stocks and an index of 
100 selected high priced stocks which are kept by the Maga-
zine of Wall Street. This portion of the article contained 
work more similar in nature to that included in this thesis 
than any other that could be discovered. However, even in 
Mr. Clifford's article the major thought was centered around 
the current position of certain low priced stocks and the 
present investment possibilities inherent in these selected 
issues under existing market conditions. This thesis is con-
cerned more directly with low priced stocks as a group and 
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the investment opportunities and advantages of this group to 
the investor of small means in comparison with the high 
priced stock group. 
II. The Small Investor 
A. A Definition 
It is a difficult task, if not an impossible one, 
to attempt to clearly and concisely define the small invest-
or or, as he is often referred to, the investor of small 
means. No specific qualifications can be set down as rigid 
limits beyond which a small investor would automatically be-
come a large investor. The writer has variously heard and 
read of the small investor being referred to as one with less 
than anywhere from $10,000 to $100,000 available for invest-
ment. 
David F. Jordan, late Professor of Finance at New 
York University, had the following opinion pertaining to in-
vestors of limited means. 
11 Although investors include persons 
with only a few hundred dollars as well 
as others with many thousands, it is prob-
ably true that the individual with less 
than $1,000 at his command would be well 
advised to place his funds in a savings 
institution rather than in securities. It 
might well be argued that the individual 
with less than $5,000 might follow the 
same plan because it is only at the $10,000 
level that the investor approaches the 
point where he may intelligently spread his 
risks of investment. Elusive as the 1 aver·-
age investor' may be, it would be more cor-
rect to assume that he is a man with a 
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fund of $50,000 or more, rather than any 
smaller amount. 11* 
The writer has not established in his own mind an~ 
definite boundary between the small investor and the large 
investor. It might be safely concluded, however, that ref-
erence in this thesis to the small investor definitely im-
plies one with less than $50,000 available for investment 
and probably more nearly implies an investor with less than 
$10,000 available for investment. Thus, it is obvious that 
the writer is closer in agreement with Dr. Kamm of Baldwin-
Wallace College who adheres to the theory that satisfactory 
diversification can be accomplished with only a few thousand 
dollars or less rather than with the theory of the late Pro-
feasor Jordan as mentioned above. 
B. Primary Financial Requirements 
1. Savings 
In any discussion of primary financial requirements 
which should be satisfied prior to any common stock invest-
ment, it should be constantly kept in mind that every case 
is an individual one and, thereby, peculiar as to its own re-
quirements. However, any person considering common stock in-
vestment should make prior provision for cash savings. The 
writer is of the opinion that a minimum of at least three 
months income should be set aside in a savings account as a 
* 7, p.235-236 
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cash reserve. If the individual desires to keep a greater 
amount in cash, then, obviously, he will hold a much strong-
er financial position. The actual amount held, however, will 
be set by the personal requirements and desires of the indi-
vidual. The need for a cash reserve can not be overstressed 
and one who fails to give proper consideration to this item 
is on the road to financial difficulty. 
2. Insurance 
Sufficient insurance protection is another neces-
sary financial requirement to be considered prior to common 
stock investment. It is of vital importance that one makes 
adequate provision for those who might be dependent upon him. 
The insurance requirement of a man with a family will natu-
rally be larger, especially where adequate provision for 
young children is to be made, than will the requirement of a 
man with only one dependent. It is, of course, dependent up-
on the decision of the individual as to what type of insur-
ance best fits his particular situation and desires. Many 
find some type of life insurance sufficient, whereas, others 
desire, in addition, some for.m of annuity policy. The writer 
is of the personal opinion that term insurance accompanied by 
a self-investing plan has a decided advantage over other 
types of life insurance. It is admitted, however, that a 
great deal of determination must be exercised to keep up the 
Accompanying self-investing plan and that without it the 
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advantage is lost. 
3. Government Bonds 
It is almost universally admitted in financial cir-
cles that any well-diversified portfolio of necessity in-
cludes some bonds, especially government bonds. It is diffi-
cult for the small investor to include a sufficient number of 
corporate bonds in his portfolio to provide proper diversifi-
cation among the bonds. However, the writer adheres to the 
opinion that U. s. Government bonds can stand alone in any 
portfolio. The small investor would probably be most inter-
ested in Series E bonds, which yield 2.9% over the ten year 
period. 
The amount of U. s. Government bonds the small in-
vestor should hold is dependent upon the amount of money he 
has available for investment and the amount of cash savings 
reserve he has set aside. It is advisable, however, that 
even the investor of most limited means hold some u. s. Gov-
ernment bonds in his portfolio. 
4. Real Estate 
It is argued by many financial writers that even 
the smallest investor should own real estate in the form of 
a home before considering investment in common stocks. The 
writer believes, however, that this decision should be left 
to the individual investor. Although it is desirable for the 
small investor to own his home, reasons advanced in favor of 
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this position do not seem to justiry it as being a necessit~ 
On the other hand, every small investdr, allowing ror certain 
exceptions, should have some established plan along this line. 
c. Investment Knowledge Required 
1. General. Conditions 
The small investor should make every errort to gain 
whatever knowledge he can or general business conditions and 
or economic ractors which might arfect the stock market, a 
particular industry or a particular company. It is not ex-
pected that the small investor make these subjects a ru11 
time study, but he should be willing to devote as much study 
as possible to a security previous to its selection for his 
portrolio, and keep a watchful eye on all the securities he 
owns or is interested in. This involves constant alertness 
on the part of the small investor to current business and 
economic conditions. 
2. Factors To Be Considered 
There are a number or factors that should be taken 
into consideration by any investor when contemplating invest-
ment in securities, and that warrant continued attention, should 
such investment be undertaken. Probably basic among these rae-
tors is the business cycle. The present phase or the busi-
ness cycle along with its indicated trend is always an im-
portant element or control in the action of security markets. 
"Business barometers" are considered a means of 
1.1. 
measuring business activity and its direction. There are 
many "business barometers" available .for those who might be 
interested in them, and their meanings may be self-explanatory 
or extremely complex. These "barometers" include such items 
as bank clearings and debits, commodity prices, crop condi-
tions, gross national product, national income and the cost 
of living index. It is advisable that the small investor 
.follow a .few of these rtbarometersn which he .feels would be of 
the utmost importance to his type of investment. 
The condition of the stock market itself is another 
.factor important to any investor. Such condition of the mar-
ket may be divided into its fundamental position and its 
technical position. The fundamental position of the stock 
market is dependent upon the wverall current economic situa-
tion. On the other hand, the technical position of the stock 
market is dependent upon the action of stocks on the market 
itself. 
There are many other miscellaneous factors which 
also deserve consideration. Among those which probably 
should be mentioned is the effect of the stock market on bus-
iness. Although it is known that the stock market reacts to 
the condition and activity of business, it should be realiz-
ed by all investors that business might react to the condition 
and activity of the stock market. Another relatively import-
ant factor to be considered is taxation. The effect of this 
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item on business profits is obvious from World War II exper-
ience. Strikes and political action also bear watching by 
the investor. 
In summa~, the investor must be aware of things, 
and have the capacity to give some kind of interpretation to 
them. 
III. Low Price Vs. High Price Stocks 
A. General Discussion 
Assuming that the small investor has taken into 
account the necessary primary financial requirements pre-
viously discussed, he is then faced with the problem of 
selecting securities for investment. It is not the purpose 
of this thesis to advise the small investor as to the selec-
tion of any particular security. However, it is the writer's 
desire to bring to the attention of the small investor the 
relatively advantageous position he might, or might not, 
attain through investment in low price common stocks. 
Such a theory is in sharp contrast with the more 
common one advanced by most financial men. The first and 
foremost point of consideration, according to the more common 
theory, is the safety of the investment, for the small in-
vestor can ill-afford to take the chance of having his in-
vestment wiped out. It is further thought that although any 
investment is the purchase of a risk, the small investor.must 
be certain that his risk is not too great, for he must 
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be assured the best possible protection of his limited life 
savings. 
The theory adhered to by the writer is that assum-
ing the small investor has the necessary primary financial 
requirements, ie., bank savings, insurance, government bonds 
and possibly home ownership, in an amount sufficient to cover 
his needs, then any interest he might have in common stocks 
is to nmake money " either through a high dividend return or 
capital appreciation. It is agreed that the small investor 
should keep in mind the relative safety of his investment, 
however, he should be willing to accept a slightly greater . 
degree of risk in order to receive a return on his money 
which would substantiate his slightest interest in common 
stock investment. 
As previously mentioned, each individual case is 
peculiar as to its own requirements. Older people must con-
sider the day when their earning capacity diminishes or 
ceases entirely, but such should be reflected in their prim-
ary financial requirements. Younger people who wish their 
money to 11make money", and choose common stocks as the means, 
should be willing to accept the greater risk, and look for 
high yield and capital appreciation. Otherwise, the time 
involved for properly handling common stock investment would 
not be worthwhile, and it would be wiser to accept the 2.9% 
yield on Series E bonds, and use the time saved to a better 
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advantage. It must be remembered that even in the low price 
group some securities offer much safety, and also, that many 
stocks which have a low market value are actually relatively 
high-priced shares. Such considerations as these, however, 
are more directly involved with the choice of particular se-
curities rather than the selection of the group from which 
the securities should be chosen. 
B. Method ~ Comparison 
Discussion or the method involved in comparing the 
low price stocks with the high price stocks was left until 
now so that it would be fresh in the reader's mind while the 
comparison is being discussed. In any discussion of statis-
tical measurement the resultant figures might lose their 
meaning entirely unless the method of arriving at such fig-
ures is constantly kept in mind. 
As a means of evolving the comparison desired here, 
a srunple of twenty low price stocks, and one of twenty high 
price stocks were chosen. Immediately the question might be 
asked, 11What is considered a low price stock, and what is con-
sidered a high price stock?" There is no official dividing 
line between the two groups, however, for purpose of compar-
ison, an arbitrary line had to be chosen. A great many peopu.e 
consider a low price stock as one selling below twenty dol-
lars. On the other hand, the writer knows of an investment 
advisory group which claims to specialize in low price stocks, 
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and considers such stocks as those selling below fifty dol-
lars. The writer, for the purpose of comparison in this 
thesis, has considered a low price stock as one whose price 
is below thirty dollars. 
In choosing the twenty stocks to make up the low 
price group smnple, the writer attempted to be as unbiased 
as possible. The only requirement limiting their selection 
was that the market price of such stocks be below thirty dol-
lars on January 2, 1940, and on December 31, 1949. This rule 
was set up in order to prevent the biased choice of stocks 
which were low price stocks on January 2, 1940, but which 
the writer knew were selling at a much highen price on Dec-
ember 31, 1949. In order to accomplish this, an arbitrary 
list of stocks selling below thirty dollars on the for.mer 
date was drawn up, and then those which were found to be sell-
ing above thirty dollars on the latter date were discarded. 
Since the writer had no knowledge as to whether any stock 
split-ups may have been made, among the various issues, in 
the interval between the two selected dates, such was not 
taken into consideration in the drawing up of the respective 
lists. 
-The list or stocks composing the high price group 
was selected in the same manner as that described above for 
the low price group, with the exception that the market price 
on the respective dates had to be above thirty dollars. 
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However, in choosing the stocks for the high price group, the 
writer did make some attempt to select those stocks which he 
thought would adequately represent a high type of investment 
in common stocks. Such was attempted, so that a fair compar-
ison might be made between common stocks of the type most 
financial writers believe appropriate for the small investor, 
and common stocks of the low price group. 
Other than the inclusion of one utility company and 
two railroad companies in each group, no attempt was made to 
include an equal number of companies from each industry rep-
resented in the samples. An attempt was made, however, to 
represent a wide variety of industries in each group. It was 
felt that this would make the samples more representative of 
high price and low price stocks. The resultant lists of low 
price and high price stocks, along with their market prices, 
are shown in Table I and II respectively. 
After the stocks in each group had been selected, 
it was assumed that ten shares of each issue were purchased. 
The assumed purchase of one share of each stock, rather than 
ten shares, would have served the same purpose, however, it 
was thought that ten shares of each stock would give a more 
realistic atmosphere to the comparison. The date of purchase 
of the shares was assumed to be January 2, 1940, and the com-
parison of the two groups was made from that date to December 
31, 1949. 
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Table I 
Market P!'ices of Low Price Grou,..E, 
Mkt. Price 
Company 1/2/40 
Amer. Locomotive 22 
Armour & Co. 5 3/4 
Bath Iron Works 
Budd Co. 
Bullard Co. 
Com. Solvents 
Electric Boat 
Florsheim Shoe 
General Baking 
General Bronze 
Gimbel Bros. 
G. M. & 0. RR 
Inter. Tel. & Tel. 
LeHrner Stores 
Nash Kelvinator 
Nat. Dist. Prod. 
Penn. RR 
R. C. A. 
St. Regis Paper 
Socony-Vacuum Oil 
12 3/4 
5 5/8 
22 1/2 
14 5/8 
16 3/4 
24 
7 1/2 
3 
8 3/4 
3 1/2 
4 
27 1/4 
6 7/8 
24 1/2 
24 1/8 
5 5/8 
3 1/4 
12 3/8 
Stk. Splits & Mkt. Price 
Stk. Dividends 12/31/49 
* 
3-2, 4-3 
3-1 
3-1 
15 5/8 
7 7/8 
14 5/8 
12 7/8 
18 1/4 
20 1/4 
17 
14 5/8 
10 3/4 
14 
15 3/8 
13 1/4 
9 1/4 
22 3/4 
17 
22 3/4 
17 
12 1/2 
8 1/8 
16 1/2 
* 25% stock dividend of $2 cumulative convertible preferred. 
Market price on 12/31/49 was 34 3/4. 
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Table II 
Market Prices of Higg Price Group 
Company: 
American Can 
Amer. Tel. & Tel. 
Armstrong Cork 
Chrysler 
Dov1 Chemical 
duPont de Nemours 
Eastman Kodak 
General Electric 
General Mills 
General i·;:otors 
:Monsanto Chemical 
Norf. & West. Ry. 
Pitt. Plate Glass 
Proctor & Gamble 
Sears, Roebuck 
Stand. Oil (N.J.) 
United Fruit 
United Shoe 'M8ch. 
Union Carbide 
Union Pacific RR 
Mkt. Price Stk. Splits & 
_.J./2/40~- Stk. Dividends 
113 1/2 
170 7/8 
38 5/8 
89 1/2 
141 
182 
166 
40 5/8 
91 
54 7/8 
107 1/2 
214 
100 
65 1/2 
85 1/4 
44 
85 
82 1/2 
86 3/4 
94 
2-1 
4-1, 2 1/276 
4-1 
5-1, 5% .. 
3-1 
3-1 
4-1 
4-1 
4-1 
2 1/2;'.6, 2% 
3-1 
3-1 
2-1 
Mkt. Price 
12/31/49 
106 
146 3/8 
50 1/2 
67 1/4 
54 7/8 
61 3/4 
46 1/2 
42 1/8 
56 
71 3/4 
56 
49 1/2 
37 
85 
44 
66 3/4 
55 1/4 
45 
44 1/4 
' 
83 1/4 
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It is admitted that the ten year period selected 
was one of rapid growth and rising market prices, but such 
affected both groups, and should not rule out the selection. 
Also, since reports on all the various companies were not 
available for the full year 1950 at the time this part of 
the work was being compiled, December 31, 1949 was chosen 
as the final date. 
The next step was to compute the coat of the shares 
purchased in each company, and find the total cost of all the 
shares in each group. It should be mentioned at this point 
thnt no broker conrrniasiona were taken into consideration in 
this comparison ~f the two common stock groups. Although it 
is admitted that the broker commission is a factor to be con-
sidered by all investors, the writer felt that ita inclusion 
here '.vould merely serve to complicate the question being 
considered. 
After the total purchase cost of ten shares of the 
stock of each company in the low price and high price group 
W9S computed, the market value of the share;3 on December 31, 
1949 had to be found for each group. This involved reference 
to the recorda of each company in the two groups in order to 
determine whether any stock split-ups or stock dividends had 
been made during the ten year period. If any stock split-ups 
had been made, the resultant number of shares was computed. 
iNhere stock dividend payments were made, whole shares were 
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Table III 
Cost and Final Value of Stocks in ~ Price Group 
(Based on Purchase of 10 Shares) 
Company 
Cost ($) 
1/2/40 
Resultant Value ($) 
No. of Shares 12/31/49 
Amer. Locomotive 
Armour & Co. 
Bath Iron Works 
Budd Co. 
Bullard Co. 
Com. Solvents 
Electric Boat 
Florsheim Shoe 
General Bal{ing 
General Bronze 
Gimbel Bros. 
G.!vi.& O. R..B. 
Inter. Tel. & Tel. 
Lerner Stores 
Ne.sh Kelvinator 
Nat. Dist. Prod. 
Penn. HR 
R. C. "-._. 
St. Regis Paper 
Socony-Vacuum Oil 
Total 
Ave. Cost I Share 
220.00 
57.50 
127.50 
56.25 
225.00 
146.25 
167.50 
240.00 
75.00 
30.00 
87.50 
35.00 
40.00 
272.50 
68.75 
245.00 
241.25 
56.25 
32.50 
123.75 
2,547.50 
;$12.74 
Ave. Final v~lue I Share (250 shs.) 
Percentage Increase in Total Value 
10 156.25 
10 78.25 
10 146.25 
10 128.75 
10 182.50 
10 202.50 
10 170.00 
10 146.25 
10 107.50 
10 140.00 
20 307.50 
10 132.50 
10 192.00 
30 682.50 
10 176.25 
30 682.50 
10 170.00 
10 125.00 
10 80.00 
10 165.00 
250 4,070.00 
59.7% 
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Table IV 
Cost and Final Vr:;lue of Stocks in !!.!.gh Price Group 
--
(Based on Purch·'lse of' 10 Shares) 
Cost (~) Resultant Va.lue 
Company 1/2/40 No. of' Shares 12/31/49 
American Can 1,135.00 10 1,060.00 
Am.er. Tel. & Tel. 1,708.75 10 1,463.75 
Armstrong Cork 386.25 10 505.00 
Chrysler 895.00 20 1,353.00 
Dow Chemical 1,410.00 41 2,249.88 
duPont de Nemours 1,820.00 40 2,470.00 
Eastman Kodak 1,660.00 52 2,418.00 
General Electric 406.25 10 420.00 
General Mills 910.00 30 1,657.50 
General Motors 548.75 10 717.50 
Monsanto Chemical 1,075.00 30 1,680.00 
Norf'. (~ West. Ry. 2,140.00 40 1,940.00 
Pitt. Plate Glass 1,000.00 40 1,480.00 
Proctor & Gamble 655.00 10 850.00 
Sears, Roebuck 852.50 40 1,760.00 
Stand. Oil (N.J.) 440.00 10 667.50 
United Fruit 850.00 30 1,657.00 
United Shoe Mach. · 825.00 10 450.00 
Union Carbide . 867.50 30 1,327.50 
Union Pacific RR 940.00 20 1,665.00 
Total 20 ,525 .. 00· 493 27,793.13 
Ave. Cost I Share $102.63 
Ave. Final Value I Share (493 shs.) $56.'37 
Percentage Increase in Total Value 
considered to be held along with the original shares to Dec-
ember 31, 1949. However, in the case of resultant script, 
it was figured at its market value on December 31, 1949 and 
added to cash dividends received during the ten year period. 
From the records of the various companies, cash 
dividends were computed on all shares held as of the time the 
payments were made. These payments were then totaled for the 
ten year period, together with any script held as mentioned 
above, and a grand total was taken for each group. 
A special explanation should probably be made at 
this point regarding the handling of the preferred stock 
,dividend paid on Electric Boat Company common stock. On 
July 10, 1946 a 25% stock dividend was paid on the common 
shares in the form of Electric Boat Company $2 cumulative 
convertible preferred stock. For the purpose of uniformity, 
it was assumed, as in the case of script, that the resultent 
preferred shares were held until December 31, 1949. At this 
date, the preferred was assumed to have been sold at the 
prevailing market price, and the resultant sum was added to 
the dividends received on the whole shares of preferred dur-
'1ng the period held. This total was in turn added to the 
cash dividends received on the common stock over the ten 
year period. 
Dividend yields were computed as an averRge annual 
per share yield for the ten year period based upon the 
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purchase price. It is appropriate at this point to clariry 
the above statement for it is not as simple as it might at 
first appear. ·,·1hen the writer says, "annual average per 
share yield", he has in mind the original shares purchased 
on January 2, 1940. If the original ten shares purchased 
have later increased to thirty shares, through a stock split-
up, and dividends over part of the period have been collected 
on thirty shares, such dividends were still considered to 
have been paid on the original ten shares. In other words, 
the writer interpreted that although the number of shares 
actually increased three-fold, the total amount of dividends 
received over the period was a return on the original capital 
invested. For this reason, it is stated that the yield is 
"based on the purchase priceu. Thus, the yields stated in 
this comparison are applicable only to the particular sto.ck 
when purchased on January 2, 1940 and held to December 31, 
1949. The average yield ror each group was also computed. 
The percentage increase in the value of the shares 
(percentage of capital appreciation) was computed for all 
the various companies. This percentage was also computed for 
eaoh of the two groups. 
The resultant computations are shown in Tables I, 
II, III, IV, V and VI. 
After the results of the comparison described above 
have been discussed, the writer will briefly analyse the 
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Table V 
Income, Yield and Appreciation 
of Stocks ,!E. ~ Price Group 
Company 
Amer. Locomotive 
Armour & Co. 
Bath Iron ~.vorks 
Budd Co. 
Bullard Co. 
Com. Solvents 
Electric Boat 
Florsheim Shoe 
General Baking 
General Bronze 
Gimbel Bros. 
G.M.&O. RR 
Inter. Tel. & Tel. 
Lerner Stores 
Nash Kelvinator 
Nat. Dist. Prod. 
Penn. RR 
R. C. A. 
St. Regis Paper 
Socony-Vacuum Oil 
Total 
Average Yield 
Total Income 
Received {$} 
81.50 
9.00 
232.50 
15.00 
152.50 
90.00 
221.88 
121.23 
66.50 
58.00 
146.,50 
10~00 
Nil 
310.00 
75.25 
442.50 
172.50 
24.00 
16.50 
75.80 
2,341.16 
Ave. Annual 
Yield <%> 
3.71 
1.57 
18.23 
3.76 
6.78 
6.12 
13.25 
5.04 
8.87 
19.33 
16.75 
2.86 
Nil 
11.38 
10.94 
18.05 
7.16 
4.27 
5.08 
6.12 
% Capital 
Appreciation 
-34.6 
36.1 
14.6 
128.8 
-18.9 
38.5 
1.5 
-39.1 
43.3 
366.7 
397.,5 
278.5 
144.3 
150.0 
156,4 
178.6 
-29.6 
122.2 
146.2 
30.0 
Total increased value of investment (appreciation 
plus dividends) in percent equaled 151.7% 
25 
Table VI 
Income~ Yield ~ Appreciation 
£!: Stocks 1!1 !!!sa-. Price Group 
Company 
American Can 
Amer. Tel. & Tel. 
Armstrong Cork 
Chrysler 
Dow Chemical 
duPont de Nemours 
Eastman Kodak 
General Electric 
General Mills 
General Motors 
Monsanto Chemical 
Nor.f.&West.Ry. 
Pitt. Plate Glass 
Proctor & Gamble 
Sears~ Roebuck 
Stand. Oil (N.J.) 
United Fruit 
United Shoe Mach. 
Union Carbide 
Union Paci.fic RR 
Total Income 
Received ($) 
305.00 
900.00 
203.50 
460.00 
350.(00 
713.50 
690.75 
15~.00 
498.80 
352.50 
365.00 
1~325.00 
513.50 
310.00 
575.00 
293.24 
587.50 
338.75 
350.50 
730.00 
Total 10~323.54 
Average Yield 5.0% 
Ave. Annual 
Yield <%> 
2.69 
5.26 
5.27 
5.14 
2.48 
3.93 
4.16 
3.92 
5.49 
6.43 
3.39 
6.19 
5.13 
4.74 
6.77 
6.65 
6.90 
4.12 
4.03 
7.77 
% Capital 
Appreciation 
-6.6 
-14.3 
30.7 
51.2 
59.6 
35.7 
45.6 
3.4 
82.2 
30.7 
56e3 
-9.3 
48.0 
29.8 
106.7 
51.7 
94.9 
-45.4 
53.1. 
77.1 
Total increased value o.f investment {appreciation 
plus dividends) in percent equaled 85.8% 
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December 31, 1949 capital position of the three best perform-
ers in each of the two groups. The price performance of 
these six companies from 1944 to the present will then be 
described and compared. 
c. Discussion of Results 
The market prices c£ the stocks included in the low 
price group on January 2, 1940 ranged from a low of 3 to a 
high of 27t. The group had an average market price on this 
date of ;~12. 74 per share. Thus, the total purchase cost of 
ten shares of common stock of each of the twenty companies in 
the low price group was $2,547.50. Stock split-ups and 
stock dividends were infrequent among the companies in this 
group, and only in the case of three companies was the re-
sultant number of shares on December 31, 1949 greater than 
the original number purchased. However, the total value of 
the number of shares held in the low price group on December 
31, 1949 W8.S :~4,070.00. This amounted to a capital appre-
ciation over the ten year period, on the original investment, 
of ~1,522.50 or 59.7%. The percentage change in the value 
of the shares over the period for the various companies in-
cluded ranged from -39.1% to 397.5%. Of the twenty compan-
ies in the low price group, the shares of sixteen companies 
appreciated in value, and the shares of four companies de-
preciated in value. Dividends were paid, at some time dur-
ing the period, by all companies, with the exception of 
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International Telephone and Telegraph. Of those companies 
paying dividends, the dollar amounts for the ten year period 
on the number of shares held ranged from a low of $9.00 to a 
high of $442.50. In the low price group, the average annual 
yield per share, over the ten year period, based on the orig-
inal purchase price was 9.2%. The total dollar amount of 
such dividends for the group amounted to $2,343.16. There-
fore, assuming such dividends to have been held until Decem-
ber 31, 1949, and considering the market value of the shares 
held on that date, the total value of 'the original investment 
has increased to $6,413.16. The increase in value over the 
original investment amounted to a percentage increase of 
151.7%. 
The companies in the low price group whose shares 
showed the highest percentage of capital appreciation were: 
Gimbel Brothers; General Bronze; Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Rail-
road; and National Distillers Products~ These companies are 
shown with their percentage figures, along with a similar 
group from the high price stocks, in Table VII. 
Those companies in which the value of their shares 
depreciated over the period were: Florsheim Shoe, American 
Locomotive, Pennsylvania Railroad, and The Bullard Company. 
These companies are shown, along with their percentage fig-
ures, in Table VIII. 
The companies which showed the highest average 
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Table VII 
St<?,_~ .?howin..s. th~ ~argest 
_t~~-~~~- .of _9api tal:_ ~..EJ>_!'eciation 
% Capital 
Co~ Rank ~j)~_?:"eciation 
--
Low Price Group: 
Gimbel Brothers 1 366.7 
General Bronze 2 366.7 
Gulf, Mobile & Ohio RR 3 278.5 
Nat. Distillers Prod. 4 178.6 
High Price Group: 
Sears, Roebuck 1 106.7 
United Fruit 2 94.9 
General Mills 3 82.2 
Union Pacific RR 4 77.1 
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Low 
Table VIII 
Stocks Showing the Larg~ 
Percent or Capi~ Depreciation 
% Capital 
ComR~Z Rank Depre_c-~iation 
Price Group: 
Florsheim Shoe 20 -39.1 
Amer. Locomotive 19 -34.6 
Pennsylvania RR 18 -29.6 
Bullard Co. 17 ;..18.9 
High Price Group: 
United Shoe Mach. 20 -45.4 
American Tel. & Tel. 19 -14.3 
Norrolk & Western RR 18 -9.3 
American Can 17 -6.6 
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annual yield ror the low price and high price groups are 
listed in Table IX along with their respective yields. In 
the low price group, these companies were: General Bronze, 
Bath Iron Works, National Distillers Products, Gimbel Broth-
ers, and Electric Boat Company. 
The January 2, 1940 market prices or the stocks 
included in the high price group ranged rrom a low or 38 5/8 
on Armstrong Cork to a high or 214 on Norfolk and Western 
Railway. The group had an average market price on this date 
of $102.62~ per share. Thus, the total purchase cost of ten 
shares of common stock or each of the twenty companies includ-
ed in the high price group was $20,525.00. Stock split-ups 
and stock dividends were much more frequent in this group 
than in the low price group, and in twelve companies the re-
sultant number or shares on December 31, 1949 was greater 
than the original number purchased. !he total value of the 
number or shares held in the high price group on December 3~, 
1949 was $27,793.13. This only amounted to a capital appre-
ciation over the t~n year period, on the original investmen~, 
of $7,268.13 or 35.4%. Just as in the case or the low price 
group, the shares or sixteen of the twenty companies apprec-
iated in value, and the shares or four companies depreciated 
in value. This is a startling result, in that, if high price 
stocks provide better protection ror invested capital than do 
low price stocks, as is normally considered to be true, then 
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Table IX 
Stocks Showing the Highest 
Average Annual Yield 
Ave. Annual 
Com;ean:I Rank Yield (%) 
-
Low Price Group: 
General Bronze 1 19.33 
Bath Iron Works 2 18.23 
Nat. Distillers Prod. 3 18.05 
Gimbel Brothers 4 16.75 
Electric Boat Co. 5 13.25 
High Price Group: 
Union Pacific RR 1 7.77. 
United Fruit Co. 2 6.90 
Sears, Roebuck 3 6.77 
Standard Oil (N.J.) 4 6.65 
General Motors 5 6.43 
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one would rightfully expect a better result from them on 
this score than was actually shown. 
In the high price group, all companies paid some 
dividends during the ten year period, and it must be admitt-
ed that the average of the group was much steadier in this 
respect than was the average of the low price group. The 
dollar amount of dividends paid by the high price group over 
the period on the shares held ranged from a low of $159.00 
on General Electric to a high of $1,325.00 on Norfolk and 
Western Railway. However, in the high price group, the aver-
age annual yield per share, over the ten year period, based on 
the original purchase price was only 5.0%. This compares to 
9.2% for the low price group as mentioned above. The total 
dollar amount of dividends for the high price group was $10,-
323.54. Assuming such dividends to have been held until Dec-
ember 31, 1949, as was with the other group, and considering 
the market value of the shares held on that date, the total 
value of the original investment has increased to $38,116.67. 
The increase in value of the high price stocks over the orig-
inal investment amounts to a percentage increase of 85.8%. 
This compares to 151.7% for the low price group as mentioned 
previously. 
The companies in the high price group whose shares 
showed the highest percentage of capital appreciation were: 
Sears, Roebuck; United Fruit; General Mills; and Union 
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Pacific Railroad. These are shown along with those of the 
low price group in Table VII. 
Those companies in which the value of their shares 
depreciated during the period were: United Shoe Machinery, 
American Telephone and Telegraph, Norfolk and Western Railway, 
and American Can. These are shown with a like group of the 
low price stocks in Table VIII. 
The companies in each of the two samples which show-
ed the highest average annual yield are shown in Table IX as 
pointed out previously. In the high price group, these com-
panies were: Union Pacific Railroad; United Fruit; Sears, Roe-
buck; General Motors; and Norfolk and Western Railway. 
Three of the four companies in both the low price 
and high price groups, who had the highest percentage of cap-
ital appreciation in their respective groups, were also among 
the five companies of each group having the highest average 
annual yield. This being the case, the writer thought it 
would be interesting as well as revealing to go a little 
deeper into the comparison of these six companies. Thus, 
certain statistics on these companies as of December 31, 1949 
are shown in Table X, and their capital positions as of that 
date are shown in Table XI. 
In Table X, it is obvious that although the earn-
ings per share of the high price stocks for 1949 are much 
higher than those of the low price stocks, the price-earnings 
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Table X 
Price, Earnings ~ Dividend Statistics 
of Group Leaders -- December 31, 1949 
Market 
Price Earn./Sh. P/E Div./Sh. 
Company 12/31/49 1949($) Ratio 1949 {$) 
High Price Group: 
Sears, Roebuck 44 4.58 9.6 2.25 
United Fruit 55 1/4 6.25 8.8 4.00 
Union Pacific RR 83 1/4 10.26 8.1 6.00 
Low Price Group: 
General Bronze 14 3.03 4.6 1.00 
Gimbel Bros. 15 3/8 4.16 3.6 1.25 
Nat. Dist. Prod. 22 3/4 3.03 7.3 2.00 
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Yield ( %) 
5.12 
7.24 
7.21 
7.14 
6.83 
8.82 
ratios of the low price stocks are mUch lower. A low price-
earnings ratio is an important factor to be considered in 
the purchase of common stocks, and in this case the low price 
issues have the advantage. It will also be noted that al-
though the high price stocks paid out a larger dollar amount 
in dividends in 1949, the low price stocks showed the great-
er yield. Yield, of course, is of obvious importance in 
considering any investment. 
In referring to Table XI, it should be noted immed-
iately that the relative size of the companies varies great-
ly, and that the high price shares represent on the average 
much larger companies. Even within the two groups, this dif-
ference in size will be noted, as may be shown by their asset 
value. For example, in the low price group, General Bronze 
has an asset value of $8.4 million, while National Distillers 
Products has an asset value of $235.7 million. In the high 
price group, Union Pacific has an asset value of $1,177.1 mil-
lion, while United Fruit has an asset value of $337.4 million. 
The net current assets of the six companies also 
vary greatly, as do the respective cash positions, as shown 
in the same table. However, although the cash position of 
the high price group is much stronger than that of the low 
price group, the ratio of current assets to current liabili-
ties strongly favors the low price group. It should be real-
ized, of course, that some of the companies, particularly 
36 
Table XI 
Capital Position ££Group Leaders 
December :31, ~ 
Net 
Cur. Cur. Cur. Cash& 
Company Assets* Liab.* Assets* Q..2:!•* 
High Price Group: 
Sears, Roebuck 605.:3 193.7 411.5 190.8 
United Fruit 97.4 53.3 44.0 77.3 
Union Pacific 181.1 85.1 96~0 105.2 
Low Price Group: 
General Bronze 5.7 2.8 2.8 1.1 
Gimbel Bros. 82.8 26.4 56.5 13.7 
Nat. Dist. Prod. 184.8 30.5 154.3 18.4 
* Millions of dollars 
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Cur. Asset 
Ratio Value-it-
3.16 808.5 
1.83 337.4 
2.13 1,177~ 
2.04 8.4 
3.14 139.0 
6.06 235.7 
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Table XII 
~ Current Assets ~ Share 
of GrouQ Leaders -- December 31, 1949 
Net Cur. Shares 
Assets Outstanding N.C.A. Per 
·Company ( $ Mil.) (Millions) Share ($) 
High Price Group: 
Sears, Roebuck 411.5 23,647 17.40 
United Fruit 44.0 8,775 5.00 
Union Pacific RR 96.0 4,446 21.60 
Group Average 183.8 14.70 
Low Price Group: 
General Bronze 2.8 238 11.80 
Gimbel Bros. 56.5 1,955 28.90 
Nat. Dist. Prod. 154.3 7,978 19.30 
Group Average 71.2 2o.oo 
Sears Roebuck, National Distillers Products and G~bel Broth-
era, necessarily carry large inventories, which are naturally 
shown in current assets. This item should, therefore, be 
constantly watched by investors under our everchanging econ-
omic conditions. 
The net current assets of the leaders of the high 
price group average $183.8 million compared to an average of 
only $71.2 million for the leaders of the low price group, as 
shown in Table XII. An interesting result develops, howeve~ 
when these figures are placed on a per share basis. The net 
current assets per share of the leaders of the low price 
group average $20.00, whereas those of the high price group 
average only $14.70. Therefore, when one considers the num-
ber of shares involved, net current assets, as well as many 
other items, often show an entirely different picture, as is 
true of those above. 
It would be of little value to compare the long-
term debt of the leaders of the two groups, for the large 
debt of Union Pacific, which is common in the railroad indus-
try, would greatly distort any comparison. Nevertheless, the 
debt of a company is extremely important in the analysis of 
its securities. 
In Table XIII, price ranges tor the six companies 
' 
are given from 1944 to 1951. Also shown in this table are 
the closing market prices for the six companies on March 22, 
39 
Table XIII 
Price History of Group Leaders 
{Adjusted for stock splits.) 
Market 
Price 1950-51 1949 
Company :3/22/51 Range Range 
Low Price Group: 
General Bronze 18 28-1:3 15-9 
Gimbel Bros. 20 25-14 17-12 
Nat. Dist. Prod. 27 29-20 2:3-17 
High Price Group: 
Sears, Roebuck 56 58-40 44-:34 
United Fruit 70 74-50 56-44 
Union Pacific 100 109-81 89-7:3 
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1944-48 
Range 
28-7 
44-5 
:32-10 
50-21 
60-18 
96-47 
1951. The writer thought it would be of interest to show 
what would happen if all six issues again advanced to their 
1951 high, or if they again declined to their 1949 low. This 
was accomplished through the use of material on Table XIII, 
which partially supplied the information for Table XIV. As 
shown in Table XIV, an assumed advance to their 1951 high 
would cause an increase in per share value in the low price 
shares of 7.4%, 25.0% and 38.9%, which is an average increase 
of 23.8%. Among the high price shares the advance would re-
sult in an increase of 3.6%, 5.7% and 9.0%, or an average in-
crease of only 6.1%. The assumed decline would cause a 
decrease in value of the low price shares of 37.0%, 40.0%, 
and 50.0%, or an average decline of 42.3%. The same assump-
tion would decrease the value of the high price shares by 
27.0%, 37.2% and 39.3%, or an average decrease of 31.2%. 
Thus, while the low price shares would advance 23.8%, or 
almost four times the advance of the high price shares, their 
decline would be 42.3%, or only one-third greater than that 
of the high price shares. Therefore, the leading performers 
representing the low price group definitely hold a more 
favorable position over the leading performers representing 
the high price group as tested by this method. 
It is apparant to the writer that the above test, 
inserted as another means of comparing the relative perfor-
mance and current position of the leaders in each group, 
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Table XIV 
Assumed Advan~ to ~ High ~ Decline 
to 1949 Low ~ March 22, ill! Price 
Market 
Price To 1951 High To 1949 Low 
Company 3/22/51 Points Percent Points Percent 
Low Price Group: 
General Bronze 18 7 38.9 9 50.0 
Gimbel Bros. 20 5 25.0 8 40.0 
Nat. Dist. Prod. 27 2 7.4 10 37.0 
Group Average 23.8 42.3 
High Price Group: 
Sears, Roebuck 56 2 3.6 22 39.3 
United Fruit 70 4 5.7 26 37.2 
Union Pacific 100 9 9.0 27 27.0 
Group Average 6.1 31.2 
42 
might be assumed to apply to the groups as a whole. Since 
this might lead to the criticism that the samples would not 
necessarily portray the resultant market action of the, 
the entire twenty stocks of each group were tested by the 
srune method. The resultant figures are shown in Table xv. 
The prices of the individual stocks in each group are not 
shown, however, the total values from which the average prices 
were obtained are recorded for both groups. 
It will be noted in Table XV that the results for 
the entire groups are very similar to the results for the 
leaders of each group which were shown previously. The assum-
ed advance of the shares in the low price group to their res-
pective 1951 high would result in an increase in average per 
share value of 16.8% compared to 4.5% for the high price 
group. The assumed decline would result in a decrease in 
average per share value of the low price group of 43.2% as 
a~ainst 33.1% for the high price group. Thus, as in the case 
of the leaders of the two groups, the low price group's ad-
vance would be approx±mately four times as great as that 
of the high price group in the assumed market rise, whereas, 
its decrease in value would be approximately only one-third 
greater than that of the high price group in the assumed de-
cline. Thus, it would appear that the low price group has a 
decided advantage over the high price group when considering 
the proportional price movements in a rising or fa lling market. 
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Table XV 
Assumed Advance 2£ Decline £! All Stocks 
in ~ Sample ~ Current Yield 
Market 
Price 1951 1949 
Sample 3/22/51 ~ &2.!L 
Low Price Group: 
Total of 20 Stocks 393 459 223 
Average 19.65 22.95 11.15 
High Price Group: 
Total of 20 Stocks 1458 1524 975 
Average 72.9 76.2 48.75 
Results 
Low Price Group: 
Percent increase to 1951 High 
Percent decrease to 1949 Low 
Yield based on 1950 dividend 
High Price Group: 
Percent increase to 1951 High 
Percent decrease to 1949 Low 
Yield based on 1950 dividend 
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1950 
Div.{$) 
30.80 
1.54 
99.33 
4.97 
16.8% 
43.8% 
7.84% 
4.5% 
33.1% 
6.82% 
D. Affirmative Considerations 
1. Average Annual Yield 
As stated previously, it is the theory of the writ-
er that any amall investor who has the necessary primary fi-
nancial requirements is interested in common stocks only to 
"make money", either through a high dividend return or cap-
ital appreciation. Although it is agreed that he should keep 
in mind the relative safety of his investment, the writer be-
lieves that the small investor should be willing to accept a 
slightly greater degree of risk in order to receive a return 
on his money which would substantiate his slightest interest 
in common stock investment. 
As an example, let us suppose that a small investor, 
who has sufficiently provided for the necessary primary fi-
nancial requirements peculiar to his individual situation, 
has $5,000 available for investment. Using the statistics · 
which resulted from the previous comparison of high price and 
low price stocks, let us assume that he invested the money, 
and at the end of the year the stock prices returned to their 
. 
original points. Thus, the only factor involved will be the 
income received on the stocks during the year. 
Investment in the high price stocks at the 5.0% 
average annual yield would result in a sum (stock value plus 
income) of $5,250 at the end of the year. In the case of the 
low price stocks, the resultant sum would be $5,460 from a 
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9.2% yield. If he invested in Series E bonds, the resultant 
sum, using the ten year average yield of 2.9%, would be 
$5,145. Thus, by investing in the high price stocks, the 
investor would gain $105 over a like investment in Series E 
bonds. If the investment had been made in low price stocks, 
the investor would gain $315 over a like investment in Series 
E bonds. 
In the opinion of the writer, it is very question-
able whether the $105 is adequate compensation for having giv-
en up the quality and safety inherent in Series E bonds for 
common stock investment. T.he investor would possibly be much 
wiser to confine all his investing to Series E bonds. On the 
other hand, if the income over and above that received on Ser-
ies E bond investment is three times greater than that men-
tioned above, or $315, as in the case of the gain by invest-
ment in the low price stocks, then the investor might be 
justified in showing an interest in common stocks. It is rec-
ognized that this difference in compensation results from a 
difference in the estimated risk involved in the two groups 
of common stocks, however, the writer believes that the sma~ 
investor should accept the slightly greater risk involved. 
The le.rgest degree of risk is involved in the small investor's 
decision to undertake any form of common stock investment, 
even in shares of the very highest quality, therefore, such 
a decision should be justified by adequate compensation. 
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It should be clearly understood that although com-
parison here has been made with twenty particular low price 
common stocks, the writer does not wish to imply that any of 
these issues are necessarily being suggested as stocks for 
investment. They were chosen at random merely for the purpose 
of comparison as a group. The writer does believe, however, 
that there are a great many stocks in the low.price field 
which are suitable for investment on the part of the small 
investor. It is not the purpose of this work to select such 
stocks, for that is a decision to be made by the individual 
investor based upon his own knowledge, experience and judge-
ment. 
2. Price Anpreciation ~ Depreciation 
Another factor to be taken into consideration con-
cerns the relative effect on high price or low price stocks 
of price appreciation or depreciation in a rising or falling 
market. The result of the test previously applied to select-
ed stocks from each of the two groups, and that of each group 
as a whole, showed that an assumed rise to a particular mar-
ket level had four times the effect on the stocks from the 
low price sample, whereas, a similarly assumed decline had 
only a one-third greater effect on the same stocks. It is 
obvious that a varying degree of effect would result upon the 
selection of various stocks under variously assumed market 
levels. Rowever, it is important to consider that although 
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low price stocks rise faster in a rising market, and fall 
faster in a falling market, than do high price stocks, the 
relative degree of rise and fall as between the two groups 
favors the low price stocks, as shown by this comparison. 
One might argue that such a statement may not al-
ways hold true, as might be shown by a comparison of stock 
prices between 1929 and 1932, or some such similar period. 
By assuming that such might be the case, it would become 
necessary for reasons of safety to limit the above considera-
tion to what might be termed normal market fluctuations as 
differentiated from such as the market crash of 1929. With 
such a limitation placed upon it, the conclusion reached above 
would be of little practical value. In the first place, the 
term "normal market fluctuations" is too general, and could 
not be safely relied upon. Secondly, even if it should be 
possible to determine what "normal market fluctuations" are, 
it would still be impossible to accurately forecast when 
market fluctuations are going to cease to be "normal", and 
are going to commence to be "abnormal". 
In support of an answer to the possible arguement 
that the conclusions reached concerning the relative price 
movement of high priced and low priced stocks may not always 
hold true, reference is made to a statistical study by Louis 
H. Fritzemeier of the relative price behavior of industrial 
stocks in various price groups from 1926-1935. In this 
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study, Mr. Fritzemeier stated the following results as con-
cerned high price and low price stocks: 
"Unless there are serious uncompen-
sated errors in the statistical work here 
presented, this investigation would seem 
to establish the existence of certain re-
lationships between price level and price 
fluctuations which have hitherto gone un-
reported by students of stock-market phe-
nomena. These relationships may be brief-
ly stated as follows: 
1. Low-price stocks tend to fluctuate 
relatively more than high-price stocks. 
2. In a 11bull" market the low-price 
stocks tend to go up more than high price 
stocks, and they do not lose these superior 
gains in the recessions which follow. In 
other words, the downward movement of low-
price stocks is less than proportional to 
their upward movement, when compared with 
the upward and downward movement of high-
price stocks."·~ 
It will be noted that the period covered by Mr. 
Fritzemeier 1 s study was from 1926 to 1935 which includes the 
period from 1929 to 1932. Also, it will be noted that al-
though the method used is not the same as that used by this 
writer, the results are almost exactly the same. Thus, it is 
relatively safe to state that the conclusion reached by the 
writer regarding the price movements of the high price and 
low price groups applies to "abnormal" as well as "normal" 
market fluctuations. 
As a means of further strengthening the conclusion 
on price fluctuation, the writer wishes to merely mention a 
* 6, p.555 
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study published in 1931 by J. H. Holmes and Company. This 
study was devoted to the relative behavior of low-priced and 
high-priced issues when purchased at or near the bottom of 
depressions in 1897, 1907, 1914 and 1921. Within its more 
limited scope, this study led to conclusions similar to those 
reached later by Louis H. Fritzemeier. 
It should be recognized that during any drastic 
market movement such as 1929, with a few possible exceptions , 
all securities will tend to suffer in price. The vast major-
ity of financial men believe that the only reasonable protec-
tion from such a drastic market movement would be· investment 
in securities of the very highest quality. Such action would 
automatically eliminate any investment in common stocks, re-
gardless of the price group. Therefore, it might logically 
be assumed, considering this point of view, that the high 
price stock group would hold no advantage over the low price 
stock group under such conditions. 
3 • Raising Quality of Investment 
The small investor should be constantly on the alert 
for any situation which might allow him to improve his posi-
tion. This may, under certain circumstances, involve a 
switch to a stock in the high price group in order to preserve 
a gain and improve quality. For example, a stock in the low 
price group may rise to a point where its price would classi-
fy it as being in the high price group. However, it may still 
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be considered normally a low price stock, and an investor may 
fear losing a portion or all of a substantial capital gain in 
a declining market. Under these circumstances, an investor 
would be wise in attempting to switch to a stock of higher 
quality and greater price stability, which might even be 
found at about the same price level. The investor may then 
hold on to his higher quality stock, or hold it merely until 
he can buy back into the previously held stock at a safer 
price level. In other words, a low price stock mHy rise in 
price to a point where it would become vulnerable to a rapid 
price decline in a falling market. Thus, an attempt is made 
to increase quality and preserve gains. The basis of the 
principal involved is similar to that employed by formula 
plans requiring an increasing percentage of bond investment 
and a decreasing percentage of stock investment in a rising 
market. 
4. ~~c~al Situations 
51 
Another consideration which warrants the constant 
attention of the small investor is that of special situations. 
It might be logically stated that the small investor, if any-
one, should be keenly interested in hunting out such securities, 
for proper diversification of them normally provides better than 
average chances of success. Undervalued securities offer a 
higher indicated or appraised value than that suggested by 
the market price. It is obvious that the price will not 
always react to correct this dirference in value, however, 
proper diversification will tend to reduce this element of 
risk. In those cases in which the price does react favor-
ably, the rewards are usually more than sufficient to off-
set the unresponsive selections. It should be noted that 
here, as always, quality is a prime consideration. Since a 
security of only average quality can become a sound invest-
ment opportunity at a sufficiently low price, it is necessary 
for the small investor to cautiously compare the market price 
with a conservative estimate of the indicated or appraised 
value of the security. 
5. Impact of Grow~~ 
The small investor should also give serious con-
sideration to the selection of a security that will do bet-
ter than the average over a period of years. A growth stock 
may be so classified since it is defined as a security which 
has outperformed the market in the past and is expected to 
do the same in the future. One can easily ascertain what has 
happened in the past, but the important factor is to correct-
ly forecast the future. Vfr.dle the past record is important, 
and may be wisely used as a guide, it does not necessarily 
indicate what the future trend will be. Another factor to be 
considered in searching for such stocks is that a security 
with a good growth record, and with indicated future growth, 
will sell at a relatively high price. This in ~tself is not 
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a bad feature, however, there is a strong tendency for such 
stocks to be overpriced. In other words, although the growth 
may continue, investors may be overvaluing such future growth. 
This appears to be the direct opposite of the previously men-
tioned special situation. In the case of the special situa-
tion, unpopularity may result in the undervaluing of the se-
curity, whereas, in the case of growth stocks, popularity may 
result in overvaluing the security. 
The attention of the small investor is here direct-
ed at the probable relative degree of appreciation of such 
stocks in the high and low price groups. It has already been 
determined that low price stocks will rise proportionately 
faster than high price stocks in a rising market. Therefore, 
assuming certain stocks of each group have equal possibilities 
of growth, and to an equally proportionate degree, it might 
be logical to further assume that the proportional effect on 
price would be greater in the low price group. It should be 
remembered, however, that here, as always, proper diversifica-
tion is of inestimable value. 
6. Effect of Institutional Investment 
Institutional investment may have various effects, 
in number and intensity, on the common stock field of invest-
ment. This type of investment has become a major factor in 
common stocks only in relatively recent years. Its impetus 
has increased in the last few years because of common stock 
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investment by insurance companies and pension trust funds. 
Any explanation as to the e~~ect such investment might have 
on common stocks would almost necessarily be conjectural. 
However, it is probably worthwhile to consider some possi-
bilities, and how they might ~~ect the individual investor. 
The large majority o~ those shares which ~orm the 
basis o~ institutional common stock investment are o~ high 
quality and/or show a good growth potential. These stocks 
are usually found in the high price group, with the possible 
exception of numerous public utility issues. Purchase o~ 
this class of common stocks by institutions may tend to build 
up or stabilize their prices when they are in ~avor. How-
ever, individual issues or particular groups may react dras-
tically when, for some reason, they suddenly fall out of favor. 
Thus, such stocks in the future may not accurately portray 
general market activity or trends. On the other hand, in-
stitutional reaction to fin~ncial, economic or political con-
ditions might result in movements by these stocks which in 
turn would drag other stocks with them, either up or down. 
This appears to be a logical assumption since many of the so-
called "market leaders 11 are held in favor by insti tut:tonal 
investors. Also, many of the stocks which are major holdings 
by institutions in large part make up the famous "averages 11 
such as the Dow Jones Indexes. Thus, the "averagesn may ~luc­
tuate as a result of the investment action of institutions, and 
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due to this fluctuation of the "averages", the overall market 
may fluctuate likewise. Then again, the overall market may 
not move in a similar manner, in which case the "averages" 
will be portraying the trend of a relatively few stocks rather 
than that of the general market. 
Regarding the latter, the following quotation from 
the column of Edson B. Smith, financial writer for The Boston 
Herald, may be of interest: 
"One of the unusual characteristics 
of the bull market which started in June, 
1949, has been the comparative lack of in-
terest in low priced issues. Generally, 
in protracted bull swings, speculation 
spills over into stocks selling for a few 
dollars a share. 
This week's Barron's (January?, 
1952) has an interesting study of this sit-
uation. It made a list of 48 low-priced 
stocks which was designed to include all 
of the more actively traded listed stocks 
that dipped to five or below at any time 
between 1942 and 1949. At their best 1951 
prices these stocks on the average were 
48 per cent below their 1946 tops. 
The whole market as measured by any 
of the accepted averages was substantially 
higher in 1951 than in 1946. The Dow-Jones 
industrials, for example, were 212 at their 
1946 high and 276 at their 1951 high. Both 
the utility and rail averages were sub-
stantially higher in 1951 than in 1946. 
All this perhaps is indirect evidence 
of the importance in the market during the 
last year of what may properly be described 
as informed buying. The concentration of 
investment demand in the better class of 
stocks and the relative neglect of what 
sometimes have been referred to uncharit-
ably as 'cats and dogs', shows the im-
portant part that investment trusts, 
pension funds and others of similar stature 
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have played on the recent market."* 
It is probably appropriate to make two specific 
comments concerning the above quotation. The first is in 
regard to the statement that ttThe whole market as measured by 
any of the accepted averages was substantially higher in 1951 
than in 1946. 11 It will be noted that Mr. Smith then cited 
the Dow-Jones industrial average as a specific example, and 
the Barron's article also referred to .. this average. ·However, 
at the other extreme, had the average market_price of all 
issues listed on the New York Stock Exchange been used instead, 
the result would have been entirely different. The latter 
average market price at its 1946 high was $50.45, whereas, 
its 1951 high was only $42.20. It is apparent from this that 
the Dow-Jones industrial average is not a measure of the 
"whole market". 
The second comment concerns the fact that the 48 
low priced stocks in the sample used in the Barron's article 
(Low-Priced Shares by Roger w. Bridwell) were, at their best 
1951 levels, 48% below their 1946 top. Also, reference was 
made in Mr. Bridwell's article in Barron's to 11 a well-known 
index of low-priced stocks" which at its 1951 high was 20% 
below its 1946 peak. In regard to the former, the 48 low-
priced stocks were subject to two conditions according to the 
article. They had to be among the more actively traded, 
listed stocks that dipped to five or below at the trough of 
* 16 
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the bear-to-bull reversals of 1942 and 1949, and also, omitted 
from the list were many issues usually included in such a 
tabulation, which might reflect special influences of a non-
recurring nature, rather than the speculative sentiment of 
the investing public. 
It is not known whether the "well-known index of 
low-priced stocks" referred to in Mr. Bridwell's article in 
Barron's was the Barron's Low-Priced Stock Index. However, 
there is some similarity in method of selection as regards 
the stocks included in this latter index and Mr. Bridwell's 
sample of 48 low-priced stocks. The two limiting conditions 
of selection that Mr. Bridwell mentioned using are exactly 
the srune as two, among others, used by Barron's in selecting 
the 20 stocks used in its low-priced stock index. ~Vhether 
the other limiting conditions of selection used by Barron's 
were also used, it is only fair to point out that one of these 
requires that the stocks selected must have dropped 50% or 
more since their bull market peak of 1946. Thus, any stocks 
selected, among other things, had to have a market price below 
5 in 1942, had to drop at least 50% from their 1946 high, and 
had to also have a market price below 5 in 1949. Any low-
priced stocks not meeting these requirements were automatic-
ally eliminated. No such limiting conditions on price are 
required of the stocks making up the Dow-Jones industrial 
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index. 
Therefore, the writer questions whether one can 
rightfully compare the two groups as regards their price 
action since 1946, especially as to whether, since 1949, 
they have reached or passed their 1946 peak. The require-
ment that the low-priced stocks must have fallen at least 
50% in the interim places them at a great disadvantage, for 
during the same period the Dow-Jones Industrial Index fell 
only 24%. It the required depreciatiol). of the low-priced 
stocks since 1946 had been only 24%, instead of 50%, the re-
sults of the comparison might have been entirely different. 
At this point, the writer would like to bring to 
the attention of the reader another viewpoint regarding the 
possible effect of institutional investment on common stocks. 
The following quotations appeared in The Commercial And Fi-
nancial Chronical in an article by Roger F. Murray, Vice 
President of Bankers Trust Company in New York, entitled "In-
vestment Impact of Pension Fund Accumulations": 
11 T.hus, we can Observe the natural 
tendency tor new money to Qe put to wo~k 
where the values seam most attractive for 
long-term investment. Does this mean that 
there will be greater stability in the 
prices of common stocks? My answer is af-
firmative for a term of ye.ars but not nec-
essarily for short periods of time. 11 
• • • • • • 
"It is sometimes asserted that con-
centrated buying of seasoned equities by 
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1. Patience 
pension trusts will gradually drive up 
prices to a point where they will no long-
er provide adequate yields. Furthermore, 
it is argued, the new issue market will be-
come favorable only to these well establish-
ed companies. Such statements, it seems to 
me, result from an incomplete analysis, 
ignoring what may happen to the funds re-
ceived by those who sell stocks to pension 
trusts. Presumably, the former holders, on 
balance, invest in other equities of lesser 
quality or personal businesses of one kind 
or another. It should be borne in mind 
that it is immaterial at what point an add-
ition is made to the stream of equity capi-
tal insofar as measurement of the aggregate 
supply is concerned. If that stream is 
free to flow in all directions, it is not 
too important whether the funds are added 
with a 'venture capital' or a 'prudent man' 
label."* 
E. Neg~~ Considerations 
This section has been set aside in order to mention 
briefly what might be termed "warnings" in regard to a few 
phases of the investment process which will confront the &mall 
investor •. It is not intended that these "warnings" be consid-
ered rules that must be strictly followed in order to achieve 
investment sucess. However, they might wisely be taken as 
a few of the considerations which the small investor should 
keep constantly in mind in order to avoid some of the many 
pitfalls on the route to investment sucess. 
One of. the foremost of these "warnings", in the 
writer's mind, is the exercise of patience on the part of the 
investor. Patience in investment, especially in common stocks, 
* 17 
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CBn often not only make the investor a lot of money, but also, 
can often save him a lot of money. Frequently the small in-
vestor, for one reason or another, may become interested in 
a particular stock, and cursory examination or analysis may 
intensify this interest. However, a more detailed examina-
ation or a truer analysis might show up factors which would 
completely alter the situation of the stocks. Had the invest-
or 11 leaped 11 after his superficial exploration of the facts, 
he might very well have regrated it later. The-position of 
the investor might well have been reversed, however, wherein 
an initial lack of interest might, after better analysis, 
prove to have been the wrong attitude concerning the stock 
involved. Complete analysis, of course, was the enlightening 
feature involved in this example. However, the exercise of 
' patience on the part of the investor, which in this example 
led to further analysis, was the characteristic which deter-
mined the final result. 
The above example can also be applied to timing and 
price as well as selection. Analysis may prove a stock to 
be a particularly interesting situation. However, the in-
vestor may feel that the present price is a little high, and 
that the stock might well be purchased at a future date at a 
more reasonable price. Under such circumstances, the invest-
or would be wise to exercise patience and withhold his pur-
chase of the stock until it is felt that the price is down 
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to a reasonable level. 
There is probably an endless number of examples 
which could be mentioned that would tend to stress the im-
portance of patience. Only two fairly obvious examples have 
been mentioned here. However, the small investor should be 
cautious not to interpret "wishful thinking 11 as patience. 
For instance, suppose that a stock held by an investor stead-
ily declines in price for some specific reason, or reasons, 
and truthful analysis shows no facts substantiating a change 
in the trend. It would be wise for the investor to be honest 
with himself and recognize this situation, rather than de-
ceive himself and hopefully believe that, as far as the stock 
in question is concerned, "prosperity is just around the cor-
ner". In such a case, the investor should be· willing to sell 
and take a loss, or, if a profit should still be present, he 
should sell and save what is left of it. It is obvious that 
to continue to hold the stock would merely be "wishful think-
ing". 
·2. ~~~!sification 
It was stated previously that the writer adheres to 
the opinion that it is possible for the small investor to 
adequately diversify his funds in common stocks. However, 
it is recognized that a tempting pitfall for the small invest-
or is the tendency to over-diversiry his funds. Proper di-
versification is entirely dependent upon the particular 
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situation peculiar to the individual investor. The writer 
strongly believes that over-diversification is almost as 
bad as no diversification. This is probably especially true 
as regards the small investor. In the first place, it is 
necessary that the small investor place his common stock funds 
in those issues where his money_ will work to his best possi-
ble advantage. Secondly, the small investor is usually fair-
ly limited in the amount of time he has available to devote 
to the attention of his stocks. Thus, by over-diversifying 
his common stock funds, the small investor not only holds 
some securities which are not of maximum benefit to him, but 
also, he has insufficient time to adequately analyse his hold-
ings so that he might eliminate such securities. This can 
lead to a vicious spiral in which he constantly becomes more 
deeply involved. So much of his limited time is spent trying 
to attend to the stocks of his over-diversified portfolio, 
he has too little time available' to devote to possible new 
selections. Therefore, more stocks are probably purchased 
which are not of maximum benefit to him. Thus, his funds are 
spread further over an even weaker list, and he becomes more 
entangled in a dangerous situation. 
It is important to remember that a good analysis of 
a security merely lessens the probability of loss, and that 
no analysis, even the most complete and most exact, entirely 
eliminates this probability. However, adequate diversification 
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supplementing good analysis, a££ords the investor the oppor-
tunity o£ a favorable aggregate result despite individual 
setbacks. 
3. Purchase of Common Stocks 
There are some "negative considerations 11 which the 
small investor should meditate upon before purchasing common 
stocks. This thesis has been b~l~d ~pon the assumpt~on that 
the small investor, having gufficiently provided for the nec-
cessary primary financial requirements peculiar to his individ-
ual situation, was interested in common stock investment. 
Previously, the writer mentioned brie£ly the attitude of many 
financial men who firmly believe that common stocks are not 
suitable for the small investor. On the other hand, the 
writer holds to the opposite viewpoint, assuming that primary 
financial requirements are adequately satisfied. Nevertheless, 
the writer is of the opinion that the small investor should 
weigh the former viewpoint and consider other possible avenues 
of investment. 
One of the moat prominent types of investment often 
compared with common stocks is bonds. Much has been written 
of the relative merits of these two, and many statistical 
comparisons have been made. It would be wise for the small 
investor to acquaint himself with some of this material, and 
familiarize himself with the relative advantages and disad-
vantages of each. It should be recognized, however, that in 
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any statistical comparison between bonds and stocks, the date 
on which the comparison starts is of utmost importance in 
affecting the results. In fact, this is probably true of 
most statistical comparisons. The comparison between the two 
samples of stocks used in this thesis, for example, might 
have produced much different results had a different date 
been chosen for the assumed purchase of the stocks. In the 
comparison used here, the writer wanted to compare the perfor-
mance of the two samples over the last ten years. This period 
was, in fact, one of growth and rising market prices. One 
might argue from this that it would be logical for the low 
price sample to show a better performance than the high price 
sample. However, the writer was most interested in finding 
the relative degree of performance. Also, it was intended 
that the results of the comparison would then-be used in con-
junction with a test of the price action of the two samples. 
Another medium of investment that the small invest-
or should consider is that of mutual fund shares. These 
shares claim the advantages of diversification and management 
for the investor of limited means. They offer him a chance 
to place his funds under the supervision of investment spe-
cialists, and thus, relieve the small investor of much of the 
time and worry involved in handling his own investment fund~ 
It must be remembered, however, that the investor still faces 
the problem of selection, for these funds are large in number 
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and varied in purpose. 
The above-mentioned types of investment are only 
two of many that are available to the small investor, other 
than common stock investment. If, after considering these 
other mediums of investment, the small investor decides in 
favor of common stock investment, he is advised to make his 
purChases cautiously. He should constantly keep in mind that 
although many people have made money in common stocks, prob-
ably a great many more people have lost money. Once the 
small investor purchases a stock, he stands to either win or 
lose. Seldom, if ever, will he just break even. 
4 Switching 
fhe small investor may use the process of switch-
ing from one stock to another as a means of improving his 
position. However, he should realize that this type of trans-
action may also lead to disaster. vv.hile the idea of switch-
ing stocks in order to attain an improved position is a good 
. 
one, it easily leads to attempts to take advantage of short-
term swings, and finally, to wild attempts to outguess the 
market. There is probably no surer way to lose money than 
this. 
Dr. John H. Prime, Professor of Finance at New York 
' University, made the following concise st~tement on switching: 
* 9, p.l84 
"Switching can lead to mere trading. 
It is justified only when definite im-
provement in portfolio is achieved."* 
65 
Only a rew of many possible "warnings" have been 
mentioned here. The writer did not intend to mention all af 
them nor to discuss any of them in great detail, but rather, 
to bring to the attention or the small investor the ract that 
there are many pitfalls which exist in the various phases or 
investment. All investors are subj-ect to these pi t.falls, but 
the small investor is especially so, for he often loses his 
bearings in an attempt to achieve quick prorits. It is one 
thing to dream o.f a "quick killing" in the stock market, but 
to realize the same is something entirely differ~nt. The 
former very often takes place; the latter very seldom takes 
place. 
IV. Conclusion 
The writer adheres to the theory that any small 
investor who has satisfied his necessary primary financial 
requirements is interested in common stocks only to "make 
money 11 , either through a. high dividend return or capital 
appreciation. The writer also believes that the small in-
vestor's decision to undertake any form of common stock in-
vestment in preference to Series E bonds involves a far 
greater risk than a decision to invest in the low price 
stock group in preference to the high price stock group. 
The return on investment in the low price stock group as 
compared with the yield of Series E bonds was proportion-
ately much greater than the return on investment in the high 
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price stock group. It is the opinion of the writer that the 
small investor should be willing to accept the slightly 
greater risk involved in order to receive a return on his 
money which would substantiate his slightest interest in 
common stock investment. 
Other than dividends, the small investor must con-
sider possible capital appreciation in his attempt to "make 
money". It is commonly believed that low price stocks rise and 
fall faster than high price stocks in a rising or falling 
market. However, it is also widely believed of low price 
stocks that the decline in a falling market is of a propor-
tionate intensity at least equal to, if not greater than, 
the rise in a rising market. An example of this widespread 
belief is expressed in the following excerpt taken from John 
Durand's booklet entitled "Your Opportunities for Investment 
in 1951 11 : 
"Investors seeking speculative gains 
often prefer low priced stocks on the theory 
that the lower the price, the greater the 
profit potential. There is some logic to 
that, in a rising market; but it must also 
be considered that there is at least equal 
downward risk when markets decline." 
It is not the intention of the writer to criticize Mr. 
Durand!s work nor to criticize, in particular, his ideas on 
the subject being discussed. Mr. Durand's statement is 
quoted here merely to give the reader a specific example of 
the prevalent theory regarding the price action of low price 
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stocks in a fluctuating market. 
From the resultant figures of a comparison of the 
two stock groups in this thesis, along with substantiating 
evidence of previous studies by Louis H. Fritzemeier, and 
also by J.H.Holmes and Company, it can be concluded that the 
existing theory on the price action of low nrice stocks is 
incorrect. It is true that low price stocks rise and fall 
faster than high price stocks in a rising and falling market. 
However, in comparison with high price stocks, low price 
stocks rise proportionately more in a rising market then 
their proportionate fall in a falling ma~ket. 
Assuming the above conclusion to be correct, it is 
logical for one to also consider the possible added impact 
of special situations and growth situations when found among 
low price common stocks as against high price common stocks. 
In other words, assuming one of these situations exists in 
two stocks, and other conditions are relatively eaual, then 
the stock with the lower market price should be selected •. 
Although institutional investment might result in 
some important effects upon the common stock ma~ket, there is 
probably as yet insufficient evidence to indicate ·conclusive-
ly what these effects might be. Nevertheless, the small in-
vestor might consider the possible building up or stabilizing 
of a stock price when the stock is held in favor by institu-
tions. There is also the possibility that some of the famous 
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11 averages" or 11 indexes.", which might be composed largely of 
stocks considered to be of higher quality and held in favor 
by insti~utional investors, will tend to indicate the trend 
of the groups of which they are composed rather than of the 
general market. 
As mentioned previously, many financial writers be-
lieve that the small investor should confine his common stock 
investments to the so-called "blue chips". For example, John 
Emmett Kirshman in his book ·entitled "Principles of Invest-
ment 11 said: 
"Only one principle of great importance 
needs be stressed. Since the small investor 
cannot afford to lose, he should confine his 
investments to only the trusted and tried 
issues."* 
However, the writer believes that the small investor can 
find stocks of sufficient quality in the low price group as 
well as the high price group in·which the so-called 11blue 
chips" are normally found. It might be safely concluded that 
the comparison of the leading performers of the two groups 
bears out the writer's theory. 
The probability that the advantages of low price 
stocks might work in the small investor's favor is highly de-
pendent upon adequate diversification. The small investor 
should remember that proper diversification is entirely de-
pendent upon the particular situation peculiar to the 
* 8, p.847 
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individual investor. Of course, basic rules of diversifica-
tion should be followed such as spreading the risk over var-
ious types of industries and various types of companies 
within industries. However, such advantages may be lost by 
over-diversification. These advantages may also be lost by 
numerous other ttpitfalls 11 • Should the small investor wander 
into these "pitfallsu, he would not only lose the possible 
advantages, but also, would place himself on the road to fi-
nancial failure. 
Even though the small investor weighs the advantages 
and disadvantages discussed in this thesis, and decides to 
place his common stock investments in the low price grou~, 
he is still faced with the problem of selection. The writer 
would like to stress again that the small investor should be 
willing to spend as much time as is reasonably possible on 
his investments-~-both in the selection of his stocks and in 
handling his portfolio. He must aquaint himself with all 
factors, and have the capacity to give so~e kind of inter-
pretation to them. The small investor Should constantly keep 
in mind that his selections must be based upon his own know-
ledge, experience and judgement. 
The writer would like to advise any small investor, 
who is preparing himself for common stock investment, of the 
numerous publications which are available to him. A number 
of them a~e listed in the bibliography of this thesis. Two 
' . 
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of these, which the writer believes would be of inestimable 
value are: "How to Investn, a booklet published by Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane; and "The: Intelligent Investor 11 
by Benjamin Graham. 
There are two final statements of advice which the 
small investor Should heed: 
1. Once you have arrived at a decision on a par-
ticular stock, have the courage of your convictions and 
follow through, despite what others may think or say. 
2. Although your portfolio is well-chosen and 
apparently sound, review it continually in the ligftt of 
changing conditions as they might affect your securities or 
your personal requirements. 
71 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Appendix A 
Stocks Included in Low Price Group Sample 
American Locomotive Company 
Armour & Company 
The Bath Iron Works Corporation 
The Budd Company 
The bullard Company 
Commercial Solvents Corporation 
7. Electric Boat Company 
8. The Florsheim Shoe Company 
9. General Baking Company 
10. General Bronze Corporation 
11. Gimbel Brothers, Incorporated 
12. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company 
13. International Telephone & Telegraph Corporation 
14. Lerner Stores Corporation 
15. Nash-Kelvinator Corporation 
16. National Distillers Products Corporation-
17. The Pennsylvania Railroad Company 
18. Radio Corporation of America 
19. Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, Inc. 
20. St. Regis Paper Company 
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Appendix B 
Stocks Included !a ~ Price Gpoup Sample 
1. American Can Company 
2. American Telephone & Telegraph Company 
3. Armstrong Cork Company 
4. Chrysler Corporation 
5. Dow Chemical Company 
6. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Company 
7. Eastmen Kodak Company 
8. General Electric Company 
9. General Mills, Incorporated 
10. General Motors Corporation 
11. Monsanto Chemical Company 
12. Norfolk & we·stern Railway Company 
13. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company 
14. The Proctor & Gamble Company 
15. Sears, Roebuck and Company 
16. Standard Oil Company of New Jersey 
·17. Union Pacific Railroad Company 
18. Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation 
19. United Fruit Company 
20. United Shoe Machinery Corporation 
Appendix C 
Low-Priced Shares* 
By Roger W. Bridwell 
(Table accompanying article not included here.) 
The action of low-priced shares in this bull market 
has been a source of no little disappointment to speculative-
ly inclin~d investors. While every major market average ex-
ceeded its 1946 high by a goodly margin in 1951--- 20% as 
measured by the Dow-Jones Industrial Average--- low-priced 
shares remained well below their best 1946 levels. 
One well-known index of low-priced stocks register-
ed a new high for the bull market in February, 1951, 20% be-
low its 1946 peak. Probably a more accurate picture of this 
backward group is afforded by the representative list of 48 
low-priced stocks shown in the accompanying table. At their 
best 1951 levels these issues lagged 48% below their 1946 
top. 
vVhen compiling the list an effort was made to in-
clude all of the more actively traded, listed stocks that 
dipped to five or below at the trough of the bear-to-bull re-
versals of 1942 and 1949. A few of the lows were established 
as early as 1941 apd 1948, some late in 1942 and 1949. 
* 12, p.ll-12 
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Omitted from the list were many issues usually included in 
such a tabulation, which might reflect special influences of 
a non-recurring nature, rather than the speculative sentiment 
of the investing public. 
Illustrative of the lack of enthusirun for low-
priced shares is the fact that only two of the 48 stocks man-
aged to better their 1946 tops during 1950 or 1951. The pop-
ular pair, Butte Copper and Consolidated Copper Mines, both 
reflected the insistent rearmament demand for scarce non-fer-
rous metals. Several other issues approached the record 
levels of five years ago only to back away before making the 
grade. Especially noteworthy in this regard has been the ac-
tion of Lehigh Valley R.R., National Container, Barium Steel 
and Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. 
Even more striking is a comparison or the total 
appreciation enjoyed by the 48 stocks during each primary 
stock market upswing. During the 1942-1946 bull market, gains 
ranged up to the astronomical figure of 10,550% chalked up to 
Burry Biscuit. No less than fifteen of these fast movers 
gained 2,000% or more. Investing an equal dollar amount in 
each of the 48 issues at the 1942 bottom would have produced 
a gratifying paper profit of 1,048% at the highest quotation 
for each stock in 1946 
As holders of these shares will agree, results 
have been far less spectacular during the last 28 months of 
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general market advance. Largest markup has been the 570% 
turned in by Butte Copper, while total price appreciation 
figured on the peak price for each of the 48 stocks has 
amounted to a modest 199%. Since the individual stocks ac-
tually registered their highs {and lows) several months 
apart, appreciation for the ·48 stocks when considered as an 
average mounted to only slightly more than 100%. Before 
drawing conclusions from the performance record just cited, 
investors who have patiently been holding low-priced shares 
would do well to review their action during previous bull 
markets. 
The record reveals a pattern of two well-defined 
moves, one early in the bull market and the other during the 
next-to-the-last stage. In between comes a period of con-
solidation during which the low-priced group lags behind the 
rest of the market and for.ms a base from which the second 
phase of the advance begins. 
A study of the three bull markets of the last thirty 
ye~rs- 1923-1929, 1932-1937, and 1942-1946---reveals that the 
first important advance by low-priced stocks runs to between 
100% and 200% and averages about 18 months in duration. The 
"resting" period retraces only a fraction of the gained and 
is apt to endure about a year. The second{and final) impor-
tant move is likely to carry even further percentagewise than 
the first move, averages about 18 months in duration, and then 
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culminates before the final top of the bull market is regis-
tered by the market averages. In every instance the gain in 
low-priced indexes more than doubled the corresponding gain 
in broader market averages. 
Turning to the 1951 situation we find that low-
priced shares moved up 110% on the average between the June, 
1949, low and February, 1951, high, but mana~ed to outstrip 
the rest of the market by only a subnormal 80%---another in-
dication of the low esteem in which these shares are currently 
held. The remaining ten months of 1951 produced a side-wise 
consolidation movement, with losses characteristically hold-
ing to a small fraction of earlier gains. By year-end 1951, 
low-priced indexes were within easy striking distance of 
their highs for the bull market. 
Especial~y significant are the time intervals in-
volved. Both the initial advance of 20 months and the sub-
sequent resting period of ten months parallel almost to the 
month the average duration of tne corresponding phases in 
previous bull markets. 
On the basis of historical precedent alone, there 
is ample reason to anticipate the usual second move which 
could be expected to carry as far and probably further than 
the recent rise from the June 1949, lows. Such a move could 
start at any time and last between a year and two years. 
Nevertheless, it is always dangerous to assume that history 
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will repeat and especially that stock market pattern will un-
fold in exactly the srune manner. Many developments can arise 
to upset the anticipated sequence. 
It can be argued that drastically higher income t~­
es and higher brokerage comm~ssions tended to make specula-
tion in low-priced shares ·less attractive in the year 1951 
than during previous periods when speculative fever ran hi~ 
Or again, that 11 the publicn whose traditionally unbridled 
appetite for the "cats and dogs" presumably causes them to 
soar far beyond intrinsic values during the final markup stage 
may be funneling their funds into the relatively safe haven 
offered by the mutual funds. r.iutual funds in turn display 
an exclusive appetite for blue chips, raising the question: 
Might not the shares of marginal companies be losing out all 
around this t~e? 
Vfhile it is true that low-cosf shares have lagged 
relative to high-cost investments, they are no longer on the 
bargain counter, and new purchases obviously entail much great-
er risk than in 1942 or 1949. Because a majority of the issues 
listed in the table are chiefly of interest as speculative 
vehicles rather than as conservative long-range investments, 
knowledge of their price action is probably of greater practi-
cal assistance in making selections than earning power and 
other fundrumental considerations. 
Since the 1949-51 appreciation shown is based on 
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the high ~or the year, many issues are actually much closer 
to their 1949 lows than the table indicates. For example, in 
December, Alleghany Corp. had slipped 30% below the year's 
high. Curtis Publishing, another stellar per~or.mer in 1946, 
was 35% under its 1951 high by the end o~ December. Even at 
the high ~or the year, both had appreciated less than one-
~i~tieth as much as in the 1943-1946 market. Other issues 
lagging by a similar amount include American & Foreign Power 
Co., Burry Biscuit, and National Bellas Hess. 
\~ether or not history will repeat and cheap stocks 
will again turn in sensational gains at the last minute, it 
cannot be gainsaid that low-priced shares are suffering ~rom 
a bad case of comparative neglect based on past performance 
standards. 
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Appendix D 
~~ Essential:_ Ingredient* 
By George E. Shea, Jr. 
The two most famous lines in the lore of specula-
tion and investment are also the most irritatingly vague. 
When Nathan Rothschild, founder in the time of 
Napoleon of the London branch of the famous banking family, 
was asked how he managed to make money so regularly in securi-
ties, he replied: 
"I buy cheap and sell dear. 11 
And on the question of what the stock market was 
going to do, the elder J. P. Morgan is reputed to have said: 
11It will fluctuate." 
Clearly, Rothschild's answer begs the question of 
how one is to determine when securities are cheap and when 
they are dear. And Morgan's is merely a statement of the 
obvious. Hence these trite sayings are often taken as the 
mere evasions of purse-proud men who did not wish to give 
away their secrets. 
But there is more to them than that. What Morgan 
obviously implied was that he didn't know, and he didn't 
think anyone else knew, what the market was going to do. 
* 15, p.5-6 
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And what Rothschild evidently had in mind was the 
next logical step. Since no one knows what the market is 
going to do, it is necessary to think in terms or individual 
securities. The sare course is to buy only those which are 
of~ered at prices which seem cheap. And the profitable 
course is to sell them ir and When they are bid for dea~ly. 
Which still leaves open the question of how to de-
cide what's cheap and what's dear. That is our subject here 
today---assuming it is at all possible to dissect in print 
the subtleties of an exercise in judgement. 
For that is what it comes down to --- a matter of 
judgement. And that judgement can be acquired onl~ by exper-
ience, including the experience of making errors. 
Any one who buys or sells anything at all learns to 
judge values by some rorm of comparison. We would all snap 
up an orfer of $100 ror a rickety kitchen table made or un-
painted pine. We would know without thinking twice that, 
with that much money, we could buy something far better in 
any department store. 
Likewise, we would quickly cry "sold11 if offered a 
sturdy, neatly finished dining-room table, made of cherry-
wood or maple, for only one dollar. Even ir it were not just 
t~ right size for us, we know we could sell it to somebody 
for far more. 
Now, unbelievable as it may seem, prices of 
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securities do sometimes get as far out of line as the ridicu-
lous figures just cited. The writer can remember when, with-
in three years, New York Central common fell from 256t to un-
der 9. And he can also remember when Chrysler Corp 41 stock 
rose in an almost equally short period from 5 to 138 3/4. 
It is clear that at one extreme or the other the 
public appraisal of these shares must have been incorrect, 
and anyone who took a calm view of what they were likely to 
be worth in the long run had an opportunity to sell, or to 
buy, them profitably at very little risk. There subsequent 
long-term price histories show that N. Y. Central was close 
to its proper range around 9 rather than above 200, while 
Chrysler (since split two-for-one) was not much too high 
above 130• 
Most of the time, of course, the great body of sec-
urities stay a lot closer than did those two at their wild 
extremes to what might be called their enduring values. But 
there are always some groups, or some individual stocks, sell-
ing at prices which, later on, can be seen by hindsight to 
have been justified---either much too low or much too high. 
We are not concerned here with transformations as 
complete as that which produces a pearl of great price from 
the lowly oyster. Such a metamorphosis occured when the dis-
covery and development of wonder drugs like penicillin 
brought new companies and their shares to the speculative 
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forefront. Another, unfavorable instead of favorable, was 
the blow struck at moving picture theatres in some parts of 
the counttty by television. Still a third is the current con-
version of Northern Pacific from a railroad stock to an oil 
stock. The discovery of petroleum deep under lands which 
it owns has added a completely new element of value to its 
shares. 
This kind of change generally cannot be guessed in 
advance, and even when it is, the problem of measuring its 
potential effect, and thus estimating its value, is usua lly 
beyond human capability. What we are discussing here is the 
humanly possible function of gauging the lasting worth of 
securities which are temporarily depressed, or overvalued. 
Is Chrysler, to take just one exrunple, selling at a price 
which is somewhere within the range of its probable value, 
or is it above or below that? This is the question to \Vhich 
every investor considering the purchase of a security should 
direct his attention. 
It can be answered only by collecting figures on 
earning power and dividend-paying power. The dividend cur-
rently being paid is of monor importance, even though that 
is what most people ask first about a stock. The stock is 
often a better purchase when it pays. nothing than after it 
becomes known as a dividend payer. By that time buyers have 
begun competing with each other for it, and the price is no 
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longer attractive: 
If there is a dividend, can it be continued? Can 
it be raised? vYhat is the stock-likely to be able to pay, 
on the average, over a substantial period of years? These 
are the important questions, and the only way to answer them 
is to estimate what the stock can earn, on the average, over 
the years. 
In the case of Chrysler, earnings of the past ten 
years, including a rough estimate for 1951, averaged 4?7 a 
share on the present stock. But since-results for the first 
four of those years were held below prewar figures by the 
wartime excess profits tax, it may be fairer to judge the 
stock's earning power by only the latest six years. That 
average turns out to be close to $10 a share. Thus the 
stock's present price just under 70 is only about seven times 
proven earning power, which is a rather conservative ratio. 
Furthermore, a glimpse of how high the earning pow-
er might be in really favorable period was given when the 
net profits reached $7.55 a share for a mere three months, in 
the third quarter of 1950. That's a rate of $30 a Share a 
year. Though restrictions on automobile production make this 
year's outlook unpromising, and though generally poor business 
conditions could have a further adverse effect, it looks as 
if Chrysler ought to be able to pay dividends averaging $4 a 
share or more over the years. That's almost 6% on the present 
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price. On that basis, the stock does not seem extraordinar-
ily cheap, but its price may be near the bottom of its cur-
rent range of value. 
Let's look at another, entirely different, stock. 
Dow Chemical Co. also suffered from the excess profits tax in 
World War II. Its earnings for the six years since then have 
averaged ~j)4.50 a share, including a guess of :n>5.50 for the 
fiscal year ending May 31, 1952. However, two factors make 
this figure look too low as a guide to the stock's earning 
power. One is that, except for the World War II years, the 
earnings have grown annually with few exceptions. The second 
is that the company has entered upon an expansion program 
which will double its assets in three or four years. Thus, 
taking an optimistic view, the stock might be earning $10 a 
share four years hence, or even more if corporate taxes come 
down, and might be able to pay $5 or ~~6 a share in dividends 
annually. Hence at 114 it is already selling at ten times 
the best probable earnings four years away, and the dividend 
return obtainable from it, if the stock is bought at present 
prices, can hardly. reach more than 5% for four years. 
Shares of the dynamically growing chemical companies 
sell deservedly at far higher ratios to earnings than most 
other stocks. Dow.Che.mical sells at 20 times the current 
year's rate of earnings, and if it sold at 20 times the best 
probable earnings of the next four years, it would go above 
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200 in that time. Much more than that can hardly be expect-
ed of it, and adverse conditions might hold earnings, or the 
price, to a good deal less. While perhaps not 'priced out-
landishly high, it is certainly well within its proper cur-
rent range of value, and may already have reached the upper 
portion of that range. 
From the conclusions reached about these stocks it 
will be clear to the reader that they were not picked as ex-
amples of great buying or selling opportunities. These brief 
and incomplete appraisals merely provide illustrations of 
some of the varying factors to be taken into account in such 
work. 
The present stock market is a difficult one in 
which to find special opportunities. The rise in common stack 
prices since the middle of 1949 has not gone, in general, to 
extremes of over-valuation, but it has eliminated most under-
valuations. Some doubtless still exist of which the writer 
is not aware. A few may be available gmong railroad and 
steel stocks, to pick two industries which are still badly 
out of fashion gmong investors. 
The difficulty in appraising these two groups is 
that the figures at hand are not conclusive. Like all other 
industries, these have benefited hugely from the industrial 
boom of the past ten years. The financial solidity and earn-
ings stability of steel and rail companies, on the whole, 
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are probably much greater than when they were £acing, in all 
unawareness, the bad years of the 'thirties. But their new 
strength has not been tested in the business recession, or 
even depression, which is sure to hit us some day. 
However, as Morgan suggested, no one knows what the 
future holds, for business or for stocks. The boom might go 
on another five years, or it might collapse tomorrow. 
The only possible road to investment success is to 
try always to buy cheap enough to leave a big margin for 
error. In the pursuit of that aim, a cold and skeptical eye 
for values is the essential ingredient. 
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